GIFT ENTERPRISES.
The phrase " gift enterprise " has been used to denote (a) a
species of lottery; (b) a scheme for the gratuitous transfer of
property by chance; and (c) a scheme for the transfer of
property independently of chance. It is proposed to consider
these concepts in the following -pages.
(A.) A gift enterprise as a species of lottery.
The transfer of rights of independent value, together with
the right to participate in a dispo.,ition of property by chance,
in consideration of the payment of value, has been called a
"gift enterprise." This, however, would seem to be a popular,
not a legal. use of the expression. The technical term ii - lottery," which comprehends the transfer of property by chance
for value; in its more usual form there is simply the right to
participate in a specified hazard ; in what is here called a " gift
enterprise" there is connected with this the transfer of rights
of a value, independent of the right to share in the chance.
This, of course, does not prevent the latter from being a
lottery.
In Bell v. State, 5 Sneed 507 (1857), the purchase of books
at their value with tickets for chances on certain property was
held to be " that species of gaming called a lottery," while the
indictment specified " gift enterprise" as the name of the
scheme. So in Eubanks v. State, 3 Heisk. 488 (i872), where
packages, each containing ten cents' worth of candy and an
unknown article valued at from ten cents to five dollars, were
sold at fifty cents each, the same words were used in the
indictment and the scheme was declared to be gaming.
Sometimes the device takes the form of a concert with a disposition of prizes dependent upon hazard. We, then, find the
expression " gift concert." For illustrations of this scheme,
Thomas v. People, 59 Ill. I6o ( 187 ); Ex pare Blanchard,
9 Nev. 101 (1874) ; Negley v. Devlin, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 210
(1872), may be consulted.
It is manifest that the "gift
217

GIFT ENTERPRISES.

concert " differs, legally, in no way from the " gift enterprise"
and that both are merely species of lotteries.
In Lausburgh v. District of Cohimnbia, 56 Alb. L. J. 488
(1897), a" trading-stamp" device was conceived to be a lottery. It is there said: " If the premiums should have any fair
value, then the Stamp Company must inevitably rely upon the
failure of the presentation of tickets for redemption by reason
of its requirement that not less than 990 tickets, representing
cash purchases of $99.9 o , shall be pasted in a book and produced at one time, to entitle the holder to his premium. In
this event the company, if it actually contemplates making
good its contracts, is relying upon a lottery; that is to say,
the chances and advantages of its game for its expectations of
profit or gain." But this view would seem to be erroneous.
In Goodman v. Cody, I Wash. T. 329 (1871), chance has been
well defined thus: "Anything happens by chance to one,
which was neither understandingly brought about by his act
nor pre-estimated by his understanding." In the case before
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia no such
element was present ; there was simply the possibility of
default.
(B.) A gAift enterprise as a scheme for the gratuitous trans/cr
of propero , by chance.
As has been said, to constitute a lottery, chance and consideration are essential. If authority on the necessity of
the latter is desired, it may be found in State v. Clark, 33
N. H. 329 (1856); United States v. Olney, I Deady 461,
Fed. Cas. No. 15 918 (I868); Hull v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y.
424 (1874); Wilkinson v. Gill, 74 N. Y. 63 (1878);
Yelloz'stone Kit v. State, 88 Ala. 196, 7 L. R. A. 599,
7 So. 338 (1890); Cross v. People, 18 Colo. 321, 32 Pac.
821 (1893).
Professor McClain, in the second volume of his
treatise on criminal law (§ 1315), says: " In some cases the
element of consideration has been left out of the definition,
but where the point has been raised it has always been held
to be an essential ingredient of the offence." And Somerville, J., says, in Ycliowstonc Kit v. State (supra): " It may be
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safely asserted, as the result of the adjudged cases that the
species of lottery, the carrying on of which is intended to be
prohibited as criminal by the various laws of this country,
embraces only schemes in which a valuable consideration of
some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw
a prize."
A gratuitous transfer of property by chance is, therefore,
not indictable as a lottery, but has been made so under the
name of "gift enterprise."
In Indiana, by § 2077, R. S,
188 I, it is provided that whoever "sells a lottery ticket or share
in any lottery scheme or gift enterprise . . . or transmits
money to any lottery scheme or gift enterprise for the division
of property to be determined by chance . . . shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor." In Lolman v. State, 81 Ind. 15 (88 I),
Niblack, J., in commenting on this section, said: "In common
parlance, a gift enterprise is understood to be substantially a
scheme for the division or distribution of certain articles of
property to be determined by chance amongst those who have
taken shares in the scheme. And in § 3894 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended by the Act
of September 19, 189o, c. 9o8, it is provided that "No letter,
postal-card or circular, concerning any lottery, so-called giftconcert or other similar enterprise offering prizes dependent
upon lot or chance . . .shall be carried in the mail . . ."
The clause beginning "so-called gift-concert" etc., is designated in the remainder of the section by the words "gift
enterprise."
No question seems to have arisen on these statutes with
respect to the necessity of consideration in a gift enterprise.
The case of Lohman v. State, supra, throws little light on this
point. It is conceived that the reasonable view is that a consideration is not necessary and cannot be present. No mention is made in the statutes or in the case of a consideration
being requisite. If it were held to be necessary or permissible, the statutes would be tautological, as there would.then
be no difference between a gift enterprise and a lottery, both
of which are specified in the statutes.
And it is within the police power of the state to prohibit
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this form of device. That the inhibition of lotteries is competent for the legislature, because of their injurious effect on
the moral, physical, social and financial welfare of the community, there can be no question. Their evil effect on the
community is still present, where there is a gratuitous disposition of property by hazard. There is merely a difference of
degree in the injury, and it has been so held in Long v. State,
infra.
(C.) A gift enterprise as a scheme for the transfer of property
independently of chance.
This is the latest sense in which the words "gift enterprise"
are employed. This meaning differs from those previously
mentioned in that the element of hazard is here absent. The
element of consideration would seem to be here immaterial,
except, perhaps, in Pennsylvania.
It is, doubtless, unnecessary to state that the right to
pursue any lawful calling or business is protected by the constitutional provisions that (a) the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States shall not be abridged by any
law of any state; (b) no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law ; and (c) the rights of life
and liberty, of acquiring and possessing property and of pursuing happiness are inherent and inviolate. It is also needless
to say that it is within the police power to prescribe reasonable regulations concerning any such calling when necessary
for the public welfare. And it is this latter doctrine that we
shall be called upon to consider under this head of "gift
enterprises."
In Massachusetts, by St. 1884, c. 277, entitled "An Act to
prevent the sale or exchange of property under the inducement that a gift or prize is to be part of the transaction," it is
made a crime for any one to " sell, exchange or dispose of
any property, or offer or attempt to do so, upon any representation. advertisement, notice or inducement that anything
other than what is specifically stated to be the subject of the
sale or exchange is, or is to be, delivered or received or in
any way connected with or a part of the transaction."
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In Commonwealtlz v. Emerson, 165 Mass. 196 (1896), this
statute came before the court for consideration. The facts of the
case were thus stated by Mr. Justice Holmes, who delivered
the opinion of the court: ". . . The defendant, a retail dealer
in tobacco, displayed in his shop window a large number of
photographs of distinguished or notorious men and women,with
an advertisement that -each purchaser of a piece of a certain
tobacco was entitled to one of these photographs. Upon each
piece of tobacco was a label to the like effect, and the defendant told a witness that every purchaser was entitled to a
photograph and to make his own selection. The witness testified that he bought a piece of tobacco and chose a photograph, and stated that every purchaser knew what he was
buying before he made the trade."
On these facts the judge in the Superior Court refused to
rule that the act was unconstitutional, and the defendant was
found guilty. In setting this verdict aside, Mr. Justice Holmes
said: "They [the words of the act] were not intended, and do
not purport to forbid the sale of two things at once, even if one
of them is the principal object of desire and the other an additional inducement which turns the scale . . . But the aim of
this statute is to prevent bargains which appeal to the gambling
instinct and induce people to buy what they do not want by
the promise of a gift or prize, the precise nature of which is
not known at the moment of making the purchase. There
was nothing of that sort in the present case. All that was
sold was ' specifically stated to be the subject of the sale,' and
we think it very plain that if the offer of a single photograph
with the tobacco would have been lawful, the offer of a choice
out of a number is no less so, the buyer being free to make
his choice before he takes the tobacco."
It is, of course, not within the police power of the state to
prohibit ordinary commercial contracts. But it would seem to
be within that power to inhibit dispositions of property, with
or without consideration, where the precise nature of the property is not known and stated at the time of the transaction.
The disposition in connection with another transaction may
not be dependent upon chance but only upon the whim or
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caprice of the person disposing. It is conceived that, for the
reason stated in the opinion, such a case would still be within
the power of the legislature to prohibit.
The Act of Congress of February 17, 1873 (§§ 1176, [177,

R. S. D. C.), entitled "An Act prohibiting gift enterprises in
the District of Columbia," refers to the Act of August 23, 1871,
of the Legislative Assembly of the District of Columbia, where
a " gift enterprise " is described thus:

"

Every person who

shall sell or offer for sale any real estate or article of merchandise of any description whatever, or any ticket of
admission to any exhibition or performance, or other place of
amusement, with a promise, express or implied, to give or
bestow, or in any manner hold out the promise of gift or
bestowal of any article or thing, for and in consideration of
its purchase by any person of any other article or thing
whether the object shall be for individual gain or for the
benefit of any institution of whatever character, or for any
purpose whatever, shall be regarded as [carrying on?] "a gift
enterprise."
In Lansburgh v. District of Coumbia, 56 Alb. L. J. 488
(1897) this act was considered in reference to the so-called
"trading stamp" device. This scheme consisted of, in the
language of the report, " an agreement between a number of
merchants and a corporation, that the latter shall print the
names of the former in its subscribers' dictionary and circulate
a number of copies of the book in" the City of Washington,
" and that the merchants shall purchase of the corporation a
number of so-called trading stamps to be given to customers
with their purchases, and by them preserved and pasted in the
books aforesaid until a certain number had been secured, when
they should be presented to the corporation in exchange for
the customer's choice of certain articles kept in stock by the
corporation."
Mr. Justice Shephard, who delivered the opinion of the
Court of Appeals of the District, said: "The Washington
Trading Stamp Company and its agents are not merchants
engaged in business as that term is commonly understood.
They are not dealers in ordinary merchandise, engaged in a
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legitimate attempt to obtain purchasers for their goods by
offering fair and lawful inducements to trade. Their business is
the exploitation of nothing more or less than a cunning device,
With no stock in trade but that device and the necessary
books and stamps and so-called premiums with which to
operate it successfully, they have intervened in the legitimate
business carried on in the District of Columbia between seller
and buyer, not for the advantage of either but to prey upon
bth, They sell nothing to the person to whom they furnish
the premiums, They pretend simply to act for his benefit and
advantage by forcing their stamps upon a perhaps unwilling
merchant, who pays them in cash at the rate of five dollars a
thousand, The merchant who yields to their persuasion does
so partly in the hope of obtaining the customers of others and,
partly through fear of losing his own if he declines. Again,
a limited number only (an apparently necessary feature of the
scheme) are included in the list for the distribution of stamps,
and other merchants and dealers who cannot enter must run
the risk of losing their trade or else devise some other scheme
to counteract the adverse agency . .. There is not the
shadow of rational foundation for the Stamp Company's claim
that it confers a benefit upon buyers by procuring for them an
actual discount, If its business were continued and its contracts faithfully performed, its inevitable result would be, as in
all unnecessary interventions of third persons, or ' middle men'
between producer and consumer, an increase of cost to the
latter."
The view of the court with respect to the relation between
this scheme and a lottery has been previously mentioned,
The learned judge admitted that the language of the statute might be sufficiently broad as to have an unconstitutional
application, but that in its constitutional application the device
He speaks thus of its
before him was clearly included.
operation :
" That it was not intended to apply to ordinary discounts
for cash, or in proportion to amounts of purchases when made
by the merchant himself to his customers, may be regarded
as certain; and the exercise of such power would doubtless
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be denied if expressly attempted. Nor can it with reason be
said to apply to bona fide co-operative associations and the
like. It is possible also that it might not be operative in a
case where the sale of a lawful article is accompanied by a
gift of something specific and certain, not attended with any
element of chance, and where the gift is not the real object of
the sale in an attempt to evade acts regulating or prohibiting a
particular traffic

.

In New York, by section 335a of the Penal Code, it is
enacted that. " No person shall sell, exchange or dispose of any
article of goods, or offer or attempt to do so, upon any representation, advertisement, notice or inducement that anything other
than what is specifically stated to be the subject of the sale
or exchange is, or is to be, delivered or received or in any way
connected, with or a part of the transaction as a gift, prize,
premium or reward to the purchaser."
Under this act an indictment was found against a dealer in
coffee, who had in his window this advertisement : "Try our
eight o'clock breakfast coffee; checks given away with this
coffee." A witness testified that he purchased the requisite
number of pounds of coffee (2). and that he received a present
as a part of the transaction; that he would not have purchased the coffee but for the present, and that these presents
were lying in full view of purchasers, who could makc his
choice provided he purchased as much as two pounds of
coffee. It will be seen at once that this case-Pcople v. Gillson, lO9 N. Y. 389 (I888)-was very similar to the Massa
chusetts one. The facts are closely analogous and the statutes are almost identical. In this case, however, a broader
conclusion was reached. The Court of Appeals, in an opinion
by Peckham, J., declared the act unconstitutional as an illegal
deprivation of liberty, in that it is an unreasonable interference
with a man's business or calling. The following is quoted
from the opinion :
" A person engaged as a retailer of coffee might very well
think that he could greatly enlarge the amount of his trade
by doing precisely what was done by the defendant in this
case; and while his profits on the same amount of coffee sold
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would be smaller than if he gave no present, yet by the
growth of his trade his income at the end of the year would
be more than by the old method. This statute, if valid, steps
in to prevent his adopting such a course to procure trading,
and from it to secure an income and livelihood for himself and
family. It says nothing as to any lottery, and does not confine its prohibition to the giving away or distrihution of any
other article of property by virtue of any scheme founded
upon chance
" I lay no stress whatever upon the argument that this kind
of transaction naturally induces people to purchase more than
they want of any article of food in order to get the other
article with it which comes to them in the shape of a gift;
and thus the poorer people are led to extravagance or outlay.'
It may be remarked that in purchasing articles of food-even
if one purchases more than is thus absolutely necessarythe food need not be, and in all probability is not wasted.
But aside from that, the argument is directed to that class of
sumptuary legislation which, while good enough in some
phases, is, when carried to minute details, simply unauthorized
and illegal

.

.

.

It seems to me that to uphold the act in

question upon the assumption that it tends to prevent people
from buying more food than they may want, and hence tends to
prevent wastefulness or lack of proper thought among the poorer
classes, is a radically vicious and erroneous assumption, and
is to take a long step backwards and to favor that class of paternal legislation which, when carried to this extent, interferes
with the proper liberty of the citizen and violates the con.titutional provision referred to. Equally unfounded and for
practically the same reasons is the assumption that the law is
valid as a law regulating trade and for the prevention of fraud
and deception. It has no tendency to prevent either, and its
regulation of trade is a mere arbitrary, unreasonable and illegal interference with the liberty of the citizen in his pursuit
of his livelihood by engaging in a perfectly valid business conducted in a perfectly proper manner. That a man engaged in
trade will not, for any length of time, continue to sell an article below*what it costs him to procure it, is a safe assumption,
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while it is equally safe to say that he may do so for a time
long enough to enable him to introduce his article to the
notice of the public and to create a demand for it which he
will make a profit by supplying; or he may make a profit by
supplying one article, which will amount to enough to enable
him to give away some other article with it, and permit him to
receive the average rate of profit in the business which he is
engaged in. To prevent this by legislative action, does not
reasonably or fairly tend to prevent fraud or deception in sales
of articles of food."
In Maryland, in the case of Long v. State, 74 Md. 565
(189i), the Act'of Assembly of 1886, c. 480, which directs
that "no person or body corporate shall be permitted, either
directly or indirectly, by agent or otherwise, to barter, sell,
trade or to offer for barter, sale or trade by any publication,
or in any way, any wares, goods or merchandise of any
description, in package or bulk, holding out as an inducement
for any such barter, sale or trade, or the offer of the same,
any scheme or devise by way of gift enterprises of any kind
or character whatsoever," was determined to be constitutional
only so far as it relates to transactions dependent upon chance.
Fowler, J., says in the course of his opinion, " Such a regulation of trade is in our opinion not only unwise but unlawful,
and unlawful because it is necessary neither for the health,
safety nor welfare of the people, and in its operation would
be oppressive and burdensome."
The Pennsylvania statute of June 3, 1885, P. L. 55, is
entitled "An Act for the suppression of lottery gifts by storekeepers and others to secure patronage."
The preamble
recites that " . . The laws against gambling and lotteries are
evaded by the giving of tickets entitling the holders thereof to
money or articles of value as inducements to purchasers to the
injury of legitimate business." The enacting clause provides:
"That any merchant, manufacturer, importer, retailer or
dealer doing business within this Commonwealth, who shall
offer, give or sell, or authorize or permit any agent, salesman
or employe to offer, give or sell any purchaser or customer
any ticket or tickets, check or checks, or other token or
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memoranda entitling such purchaser or customer to demand
or receive money or any article of value, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor
This statute has been held unconstitutional by a county
court on the ground that it violates Section 3 of Article III.
of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which requires the subject of
a bill to be " clearly expressed in its title." In 'Commcrzwvealth
v. Moorhead, 7 Pa. C. C. 513 (189o), Mr. Judge Endlich considered that the "phrase 'lottery gifts' must be understood
as conveying the idea of gifts in some way connected with
chance or hazard, and that it cannot be understood as embracing anything which is free from all hazard or chance," and
hence as the "title of the Act gives notice only of the former,"
while the body of the act covers only the latter class of sub-'
ject, the Constitution is violated. The same view of the act
is taken by Henry S. Borneman, Esq., in an article in I Pennsylvania Law Series, 223.
As has been seen above, a consideration is requisite in a
lottery. The legal conception of a gift excludes the idea of
a consideration. We have, therefore, a statute combining in
its title two legal ideas essentially antagonistic. It is conceived that one of these words can be retained and the other
rejected.

The constitutional

provision

mentioned requires

only that the title shall " fairly give notice of the subject of
the act, so as reasonably to lead into an inquiry into its
body :" Allegheny County Home's Appeal, 77 Pa. 77 (1814);

State Line, etc.,]R. R. Co.'s Appeal, Ib.429 (1875). A statute
containing two inconsistent ideas in its title would seem to satisfy
No inconvenience can result from the
this requirement.
adoption of such a view. The remaining provision of the section quoted from the Constitution, that a bill shall contain
only one subject, prevents this. There must be one subject
of the statute, ahd the double title fairly gives notice that the
contents are one of two things; if neither, then the act is
void.
Inasmuch as the retention of "gifts" and the rejection of
"lottery" will render the present act constitutional (at least
partially), it is conceived that this should be done. And it
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may be said that, there being no obscurity in the enacting
clause, the preamble is of no importance.
It will be noticed that the body of the statute does not require the gifts to be to induce patronage; but as the title,
which is in Pennsylvania part of the act, contains this, the act
may be so construed. This is admitted in the opinion of the
court in the case cited. But the body of the act does not make
the crime dependent on chance. This would seem, on the authorities previously mentioned, to make the statute unconstitutional in general when the transaction is independent of
chance and perhaps of caprice connected with another transaction. And in view of the grounds upon which the title
has been suggested to be valid, and of the use of the single
word "gift," it is submitted that the statute can be operative
only where a consideration is absent from the transaction.
The act would, therefore, seem to be applicable only to gratuitous dispositions of property by chance, or perhaps by caprice connected with another transaction.
Another view of this statute might be that inasmuch as its
body is within the legislative power to enact only to the extent to which the title (adopting the interpretation of " lottery
gifts" suggested by Mr. Judge Endich) expresses it, the title
is a valid one. There seems to be no authority on this point,
but it is conceived that, from the nature of the constitutional provision previously cited, the validity of the title of an act is independent of the validity of its contents; and though such contents
be substantially beyond the legislative province, no question
concerning them can arise unless the title clearly expresses them.
The result of the cases on this head would, therefore, seem
to be :
(a.) In general, it is not within the police power of the state
to prohibit the disposition of property, with or without consideration, independently of chance, or perhaps of caprice
connected with another transaction.
(b.) But a trading-stamp scheme or any other device tend-

ing injuriously to affect the community is within the legislative
province to forbid, and such a scheme is included within the
statutes against " gift enterprises."
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The conclusions of this article may be stated thus:
(a.) A " gift enterprise "is popularly used to signify a species
of lottery.
(b.) It is used to designate a scheme for the gratuitous
disposition of property by chance; and such statutes are
constitutional.
(c.) It is used to describe a schemew for the- bfawsfer of
property, with or without consideration, independently of
chance; and in general such statutes are unconstitutional;
when, however, the scheme is such as to be injurious to the
public welfare, notwithstanding its independence of hazard,
the act is constitutional.
TlonasJames Zleagher.
Philadelphia, Marchi 29, 1898.

